Nathan Robert Howard

Book

The Fundamentals of Reasons (with Mark Schroeder)
2024. Oxford University Press.

Publications

Honesty and Bad Faith (with N. G. Laskowski)
2026. Political Philosophy 3 (1).
Getting Attitudes Right
2025. Analysis.
Convergence and the Agent's Point of View
2024. Belgrade Philosophical Annual 37 (1): 145–165.
Gender Unrealism (with N. G. Laskowski)
2024. Ergo.
No Gods, No Masters, No Authoritative Normativity (with N. G. Laskowski)
In press. The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics, Vol. 2, ed. David Copp & Connie Rosati. Oxford University Press.
Maternal Autonomy and Prenatal Harm
2023. Bioethics 37 (3): 246–255.
Consequentialism and the Agent's Point of View
2022. Ethics 132 (3).
Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What's Right
2021. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3): 370–381.
Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts)
2021. Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30): 1–16.
Beyond Bad Beliefs
2021. Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5): 1–22.
The Goals of Moral Worth
2021. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 16, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau.
One Desire Too Many
2021. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2): 302–317.
Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons
2021. Journal of Philosophy 118 (2): 97–111.
The World is Not Enough (with N. G. Laskowski)
2021. Noûs 55 (1): 86–101.
Review of Sergio Tenenbaum's Rational Powers in Action
2021. Ethics.
Phenomenal Concepts as Complex Demonstratives (with N. G. Laskowski)
2021. Res Philosophica 98 (3): 499–508.
Broome's Too-Quick Objection
2020. Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1).
Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding
2019. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5): 1065–1078.
Review of Errol Lord's The Importance of Being Rational
2019. Ethics 129 (4): 720–726.